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the reasoned argument. After all, the dilemmas raised by commercialization will
inevitably intensify as medical and reproductive technology advance.
Deborah Tuerkheimer
Northwestern University
Va¨yrynen, Pekka. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in
Ethics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 288. $49.95 ðclothÞ.
This book articulates and defends a novel view of thick concepts extremely
carefully and rigorously. It is an excellent example of how method and theory
from other areas, in this case philosophy of language and linguistics, can be
brought fruitfully to bear on debates in metaethics. And it takes on a topic with a
deserved reputation for being obscure and performs much needed clarifica-
tions. In short, The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty makes considerable advances not
only in the thick concepts debate but in metaethics and metanormative phi-
losophy in general.
One standard characterization of thick terms and concepts—‘lewd’ and
‘rude’ are examples here—is that they have both evaluative and nonevaluative
content, in contrast to thinðnerÞ concepts like ‘good’, ‘bad’, and perhaps ‘nasty’,
which are wholly or more purely evaluative in content. Many philosophers have
claimed that thick concepts have deep and distinctive philosophical significance.
The book begins by pointing out how the many different ways in which thick
concepts have been held to have deep and distinctive philosophical significance
all presuppose that thick concepts are evaluative concepts. These many different
ways are likely familiar—thick concepts have had star billing in arguments against
noncognitivism and the fact-value distinction and in arguments for certain accounts
of objectivity in ethics, reasons for action, and the nature of evaluative thought and
discourse. PekkaVa¨yrynen claims that these arguments all fail. This is not becausehe
thinks ðin line with a familiar response to these argumentsÞ that thick concepts have
evaluative and descriptive content that can be separated out or ‘disentangled’. It is
because he thinks that thick concepts have no evaluative content ðor at least not any
that could give them distinctive significanceÞ in the first place.
Va¨yrynen’s main aim is to deflate the philosophical significance of thick
concepts. His main conclusion is that thick concepts are not inherently evalu-
ative. The case for his view is an argument for the claim that the global evalua-
tions most closely associated with thick terms and concepts are not a part of the
meanings of those terms and concepts. ‘Inherently evaluative’ here is shorthand
for ‘inherently evaluative with respect to global evaluations’. Thick terms and
concepts are inherently evaluative in this sense if these global evaluations are a
part of their meaning. Call this the semantic view. Instead, Va¨yrynen argues that
the best explanation of the relationship between thick terms and concepts and
global evaluation, is pragmatic. I discuss each of these in turn.
An evaluation ‘most closely associated with’ a thick term or concept is global
if that evaluation applies to all the features that distinguish the things falling
under that term or concept. This is in contrast to embedded evaluations, which are
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evaluations “needed to characterize the very type of things that may be subse-
quently subject to global evaluations” ð40–41Þ. Take ‘lewd’ as an example. Assume
that all lewd actions involve overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional
boundaries ðand assume that that description is nonevaluativeÞ. Then a global
evaluation would be one that applies to the features X, Y, and Z, which an act has
in virtue of being an overt display of sexuality that transgresses conventional
boundaries, for example, the evaluation that acts with features X, Y, and Z are bad
in a certain way. An embedded evaluation, on the other hand, would be present if
specifying the type of thing to which the global evaluation applies required eval-
uative information. In this case, if one or more of X, Y, or Z were an evaluative
feature, then ‘lewd’ would contain an embedded evaluation.
Va¨yrynen’s argument targets only global evaluation. He allows that ðsomeÞ
thick terms and concepts may contain embedded evaluation but holds that thick
terms and concepts won’t have deep or distinctive significance if their meanings
only contain embedded, and not global, evaluations. Va¨yrynen follows Daniel Y.
Elstein and Thomas Hurka ð“From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans,”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 ½2009: 515–35Þ in claiming that this is because
“embedded evaluations are independent of whether they figure in themeaning of
thick terms and concepts” ð43Þ. If embedded evaluations had deep and distinc-
tive significance, then they’d have this independently of their relation to thick
terms and concepts. Accordingly, the book’s target—that thick concepts are in-
herently evaluative—is the claim that global evaluations are a part of the mean-
ings of thick terms and concepts. For ease of exposition, I will follow Va¨yrynen in
referring to the global evaluations most closely associated with thick terms and
concepts as T-evaluations.
Evaluation is here understood as “information to the effect that something
has a positive or negative standing—merit or demerit, worth or unworth—rel-
ative to a certain kind of standard . . . the kind that is capable of grounding claims
of merit or worth” ð29Þ. And a term or concept T is inherently evaluative on this
view if “all literal uses of sentences of the form x is T in normal contexts entail,
as a conceptual matter or in virtue of a semantic rule, that x is good ðor bad, de-
pending on TÞ in a certain way” ð34Þ. This last suggests the way to test whether T-
evaluations are a part of the meanings of thick terms and concepts.
In arguing against the claim that T-evaluations are a part of the meanings of
thick terms and concepts, Va¨yrynen ironically draws inspiration from Bernard
Williams’s injunction in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy exhorting moral philos-
ophers to pay attention tomore ofmoral language. Williamsmeant that we should
pay attention to thick concepts as well as thin ðand Williams thought that thick
concepts had deep and distinctive significanceÞ. Va¨yrynen remarks that if this ad-
vice is sound, we should also pay attention to a rich range of linguistic evidence
concerning how thick terms work. ðHe holds that the linguistic behavior of terms
constrains what concepts they may be used to express.Þ It is such evidence which
Va¨yrynen appeals to in arguing for his pragmatic view of the thick.
This argument has two main parts. The first is a positive argument for the
claim that T-evaluations are no part of the meaning of thick terms and concepts
ðchaps. 3–6Þ. The second is a negative argument which aims to show that con-
siderations thought to favor the view that thick concepts are inherently evalu-
ative can be better explained either by general features of context-sensitive
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gradable terms or by these in combination with the pragmatic view. This argu-
ment spans chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 9 examines, and finds wanting, an argu-
ment in the literature that draws on the apparent contextual variability of the
valence of evaluations associated with thick terms, to claim that those evaluations
are no part of the meaning of those terms. Chapter 10 then takes stock, detailing
the various respects in which the significance of the thick is deflated if the
argument of the book succeeds.
If T-evaluations were a part of the meaning of thick terms ðand conceptsÞ,
then we would expect them to be semantic entailments, semantic presupposi-
tions, or conventional implicatures. Moreover, standard methods in linguistics
give us ways to test for these things. Broadly, the strategy of Va¨yrynen’s positive
argument for the pragmatic view is to argue that T-evaluations fail all these tests
and that the best explanation for this is that they are related to thick terms and
concepts pragmatically.
The notion of an objectionable thick concept is put to work here. A thick term
or concept is objectionable if the global evaluation most closely associated with it
doesn’t fit the things which the term or concept is true of. For example, wemight
think that ‘lewd’ is objectionable because overt displays of sexuality are not bad
for being such displays. Va¨yrynen thinks that all, or at least all paradigmatic, thick
terms and concepts are in principle open to being regarded as objectionable.
Since which concepts are in fact objectionable, as opposed to being merely open
to being regarded as objectionable, is a substantive evaluative matter, conclu-
sions about objectionable thick concepts will have the requisite generality.
The linchpin of the positive argument is thus a hypothesis that linguistic
data concerning objectionable thick terms and concepts show that T-evaluations
project—they survive embedding in various contexts that cancel semantic entail-
ments—and are defeasible in certain ways that semantic entailments aren’t. Pro-
jection and defeasibility are also key to Va¨yrynen’s argument that T-evaluations
are not conventional implicatures or semantic presuppositions. He argues that
the best explanation of the behavior of T-evaluations is that they are related
to thick terms and concepts pragmatically. Specifically, his view is that globalT-
evaluations are implications of utterances containing thick terms which are part
of background, ‘not-at-issue’ content in normal contexts and which arise con-
versationally. This is fleshed out in chapter 6 which aims to round off the positive
argument by telling a plausible story about how and why these evaluations arise.
How convincing is this positive argument? One thing that Va¨yrynen leaves
open is whether thin concepts can be found objectionable, as embodying eval-
uations that ought not to be endorsed. He says it’s unclear what this would
amount to, though offers as an example that perhaps Marxists or Nietzscheans
can think that there are moral properties but offer an account of them on which
morality is something to be condemned.
It seems to me that the same strategy that Va¨yrynen employs in his positive
argument can indeed be used in the case of thin concepts and that any difficulty
we have here can be accounted for by the imaginative difficulty in occupying
evaluative perspectives very remote from our own—something Va¨yrynen himself
points to in explaining the difficulty we might have in imagining ‘courage’ to be
objectionable. In other words, we could use the case of a Nietzschean finding
‘morally good’ objectionable, to argue that the global evaluation associated with
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‘morally good’ projects and is defeasible in the same way as the global evaluation
associated with ‘lewd’. Someone who found ‘morally good’ objectionable would
be unlikely to use the term in a question or embedded in a possibility modal or
epistemic modal or in the antecedent of a conditional because the positive
evaluation projects. And it seems possible to deny that an action is good for
being morally good. Importantly, this would not show that ‘morally good’ is not
an evaluative concept or that it fails to pick out an evaluative property. To reject
a concept, as Dancy puts it, one has to see its point and reject it for that rea-
son. Given that we are talking about evaluative concepts, another way to put this
could be that one has to make the evaluation and then evaluate that evaluation
as objectionable. A rough-and-ready characterization of what is going on here
could be that there are two evaluations: one conceptual and one substantive.
What it would show is that any substantive evaluation of ‘morally good’ is plau-
sibly not itself a part of the content of ‘morally good’.
Might not the same be true in the thick case? If T-evaluations are no part of
the semantic content of thick concepts, this might be a reflection of the fact that
substantive evaluations of thick properties are no part of the concept that picks
out those properties ðas evidenced by the bully who is quite competent with
‘cruel’ but evaluates cruelty positivelyÞ. In fact, this is Va¨yrynen’s view: that the
substantive evaluations that ðgroups ofÞ people make are no part of the content
of the relevant concept but instead ought to be viewed as communicated via
pragmatic mechanisms. Chapter 6 can be read as telling a very plausible story
about how this comes about. However, this by itself does not answer the question
of whether the thick concepts or properties themselves are evaluative, any more
than a substantive evaluation of ‘morally good’ being no part of its content
should lead us to conclude that ‘morally good’ fails to be an evaluative concept
or pick out an evaluative property.
So where does this leave the issue of whether thick concepts are properly
considered evaluative? At this point it is left open, I think. So we need to consider
Va¨yrynen’s negative argument. As noted above, that thick concepts are evaluative
is assumed without argument in most of the literature on the thick. However, a
common refrain in the literature, across party lines, is that for thick terms and
concepts ‘evaluation drives extension’. Parochiality ðthat the point of these con-
cepts is only apparent from within a particular evaluative point of viewÞ, intui-
tions regarding disagreements, and the way in which their nonevaluative content
underdetermines their extensions are all, at least implicitly, taken as evidence
that evaluation plays an extension determining role for thick terms and concepts
by being a part of their semantic content. Va¨yrynen’s negative argument aims to
show that the pragmatic view, together with general features of context-sensitive
gradable terms, can also explain all of these considerations. Va¨yrynen then ar-
gues on grounds of Grice’s razor that the pragmatic explanation is to be pre-
ferred. The same strategy is applied to two further claims about the thick that
might be thought to support the semantic view, namely, that thick terms and
concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless and that their evaluative and descriptive
components are inseparable.
Va¨yrynen makes a convincing case for the claim that intuitions about univ-
ocality of disagreement can’t be used to draw conclusions about the content of
terms and concepts. In addition, I don’t think that shapelessness and insepara-
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bility are even implicitly supposed to be arguments for the claim that thick con-
cepts are evaluative. The point of both, I think, is to push the view that evaluative
concepts ðwhere the evaluativeness is presupposedÞ pick out irreducibly evalua-
tive properties, where this is supposed to be a problem for noncognitivists ðand
reductive naturalistsÞ.
What of parochiality and underdetermination? In my view, Va¨yrynen is cor-
rect that the pragmatic view together with general features of context-sensitive
gradable terms could explain these features of the thick. However, it’s worth
noting that a term’s ðor concept’sÞ being evaluative is compatible with its being a
context-sensitive gradable term—thin evaluative concepts fall precisely into this
category. If it is substantive evaluations that are communicated pragmatically, the
pragmatic view combined with general features of context-sensitive gradable terms
could nonetheless be combined with the view that thick concepts ðand propertiesÞ
are evaluative. This is perhaps just a different way of making the same point that
Va¨yrynen makes, which is that the issue of whether thick concepts are themselves
evaluative is really to be decided by the employment of ða generalization ofÞ Grice’s
razor; other things being equal we should prefer the pragmatic view because it
postulates fewer semantic properties ð210Þ.
But are other things equal? It seems to me that there are a few unresolved
issues. One concerns why ðthe paradigmaticÞ thick concepts have been so uni-
versally thought to be evaluative. Va¨yrynen provides an answer to this question in
chapter 6. In brief, this is that thick terms and concepts concern aspects of hu-
man life that matter: they “are widely invested with evaluative significance or
systematically evoke various affective responses that are connected to evaluation”
ð133Þ. On this view there is no difference in kind between ‘courageous’, ‘cruel’,
and ‘loyal’, on the one hand, and ‘fun’, ‘athletic’, and ‘chocolate’, on the other
ðwhere these are nonevaluative terms commonly used to imply positive evalua-
tionÞ. Va¨yrynen holds that we can explain the appearance of a difference in kind
by noting a cluster of contingent differences of degree. Chief among these are
the differences in the degree to which the relevant evaluations are generalized:
the greater the degree of generalization, the easier it is for a term or concept to
appear inherently evaluative ð138Þ.
One worry with this is that it leaves it very mysterious as to why ‘pleasure’ and
‘pain’ aren’t paradigmatic thick terms. These terms would seem to satisfy all the
relevant criteria for being a paradigmatic thick term on Va¨yrynen’s account. For
one, they are typically used against a very broad and very strong background of
agreement regarding their evaluative significance. “At most, thick terms and
concepts may play a particularly central role in our normative thought thanks to
how intimately they tend—as a substantive matter—to relate to our evaluative
interests and concerns.”
In a footnote, Va¨yrynen offers two speculations as to why ‘pleasure’ and
‘pain’ aren’t regarded as thick: that the properties ascribed by thick terms are
less easy to characterize in general terms, and that many of us are confident that
it is no part of what it is to be pain that it be bad and no part of what it is to be
pleasant that it should be good and thus see no essential need to use evaluative
notions in describing pleasure and pain. “Selfishness, courageousness and cru-
elty, by contrast, seem not to be exhausted by their experiential aspect or its
psychological underpinning” ð137 n. 12Þ. The worry remains though, for another
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way to put this might be that while we are confident that plain and pleasure are
nonevaluative, the same cannot be said for the paradigmatically thick.
Of course, it is no good to merely carry on presupposing that paradigmatic
thick concepts are evaluative. As Va¨yrynen notes when discussing the view that
thick concepts are themselves evaluative in their own right, and not evaluative
because of any connection to global evaluations, a compelling motivation is
needed for this view.
One possible line of pursuit concerns the notion of embedded evaluation.
Recall that an embedded evaluation would be present in the content of the thick
concept if specifying the type of thing over which the relevant global evaluation
takes scope requires evaluative information. Recall that Va¨yrynen follows Elstein
and Hurka ð“From Thick to Thin”Þ in claiming that thick terms and concepts
won’t have deep or distinctive significance if they contain only embedded eval-
uations because “embedded evaluations are independent of whether they figure
in the meaning of thick terms and concepts” ð43Þ. If all embedded evaluations
were thin, and if they were genuinely embedded ði.e., could at least in principle
be unembeddedÞ, this might be a plausible claim.
But why assume either of these things? On the first, if some embedded
evaluations are themselves thick, why assume that there will be neat conceptual
divisions such that each embedded evaluation can be regarded as independent?
Our evaluative concepts may form a network with no such sharp divisions. Grasping
the concept ‘courage’ may involve grasping when it is worthwhile to pursue goods
regardless of the badness of the harm or risk of harm one is accepting. Grasping
‘harm’may require grasping what welfare andflourishing and the worthwhile are.
And grasping ‘flourishing’ and ‘the worthwhile’ may require grasping what cour-
age is. And on the second, if so-called embedded evaluations cannot be separated
from that in which they are embedded, it may not make sense to think of them as
being independent ðor, indeed, as embeddedÞ.
However, the above is of course a very sketchy sketch, and it does not do
justice to Va¨yrynen’s detailed and careful work. In the end, having rigorously
weighed the linguistic evidence and having cautioned against profligacy in
postulating semantic properties where it seems that pragmatic mechanisms can
do all the work required, Va¨yrynen concludes that thick concepts aren’t inher-
ently evaluative and thus cannot have the distinctive philosophical significance
that they have been thought to have. Though I am inclined to resist these con-
clusions, this book is a significant contribution. There is much to admire about
it and much to engage with. In my view this work will profoundly shape the fu-
ture of the thick concepts debate.
Debbie Roberts
University of Edinburgh
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